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Timothy Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New
Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018). $14.99.
Timothy Wu’s book, The Curse of Bigness, offers a brief history on and critical perspective of antitrust law’s development over
the last century, calling for a return to a Brandeisian approach to
the law. In this review-essay, I use Wu’s text as a starting point to
explore antitrust law’s current political moment. Tracing the
dynamics at play in this debate and Wu’s role in it, I note areas
underexplored in Wu’s text regarding the interplay of antitrust law
with other forms of industrial regulation, highlighting in particular
current difficulties in copyright law as one of the underlying tensions driving popular discontent with the major technology firms
or “tech trusts.” I consider the continuing influence of Robert
Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, now more than forty years old, and
how the current reform movement might execute a shift as lasting
and substantial as the one Bork spearheaded with his book.
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INTRODUCTION
Portlandia—the IFC comedy series that, in a series of interconnected vignettes, lampoons the city of Portland, Oregon, and its
reputation for what we might call “hipsterism”—has a few key
gags.1 In its opening episode, one Angeleno pitches another about
Portland’s virtues, proclaiming in song that “the dream of the ‘90s
is alive in Portland.”2 This sentiment refers largely to the countercultural trends and Gen X-ish aesthetics that are, in all fairness,
characteristic of the place.3 Later in the series, however, the song is
modified: “the dream of the ‘90s is alive in Portland—it’s the
dream of the 1890s.” 4 In Portlandia, the dream of the 1890s is
pickling, bread baking, sewing—the “hipster” resurrection of a
particular DIY ethos and aesthetic in a society that has largely
replaced the daily practice of these kinds of activities with the conveniences of consumer capitalism.5
We may only have hints about what Portlandia’s beardsporting, meat-curing, graphophone-listening retrophiles think
about competition policy.6 Yet it is, in part, their image and preferred decade that are being conjured up when portions of the antitrust academy and bar use “hipster antitrust” to describe both a
resurgence of Brandeisian enthusiasm for trust busting and a rejec-

1

See generally Portlandia (IFC television broadcast).
Portlandia: Farm (IFC television broadcast Jan. 21, 2011); see IFC, Dream of the
‘90s | Portlandia | IFC, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
U4hShMEk1Ew [https://perma.cc/386W-V5PE].
3
Id.
4
Portlandia: Cops Redesign (IFC television broadcast Feb. 3, 2012); see Constantin
Constantin, Portlandia—Dream of the 1890s, YOUTUBE (Dec. 12, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_HGqPGp9iY [https://perma.cc/V54Q-4F5M].
5
Id.
6
Although we do get glimpses in one exchange:
Jason (Fred Armisen): Remember in the 1890s when the economy
was in a tailspin; unwashed young men roamed the streets looking for
work, and people turned their backs on huge corporate monopolies
and supported local businesses?
Melanie (Carrie Brownstein): I thought we had to support
corporations—I thought they were too big to fail.
Jason: Well, in Portland, people raise their own chickens, and cure
their own meats.
Id.
2
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tion of the consumer welfare standard as antitrust law’s lodestar.7
“Antitrust hipsterism,” goes the apparent first invocation of the
phrase.8 “Everything old is cool again.” 9
Unsurprisingly, the label has proven sticky. “Hipster antitrust”
is an impressively well-coined moniker: it is tight, memorable, and
sounds as if it conveys something immediately understandable
about its target, even if the specifics of what that something might
be are stubbornly opaque. 10 “Hipster” on its own is a peculiar
word, combining in its modern usage an extreme malleability
with an uncanny specificity.11 Hipsterdom is helplessly paradoxical: hipsters are either johnny-come-latelys, or else they are trendsetters; the term refers to the artisanal, but also the manufactured
appearance of artisanality; bohemianness and bourgeoisity; the
sleekly modern and the anachronistically old-timey; the consumerist and the DIY; the edgy and the tired. It makes sense, then,
that the word can be used both to insult and to praise—a duality
that is complicated, of course, by the fact that a hipster loathes
above all else to be called a hipster. 12 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, hipsterdom also signifies youth, and the word
is often used in the dismissal of youth and particularly of

7

See Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and
Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 293–95 (2019); see also
Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust—A Brief Fling or Something More,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/hipster-antitrust-a-brief-fling-or-something-more/#
[https://perma.cc/W8ANMVVH] (subscription pay wall).
8
Kostya Medvedovsky (@kmedved), TWITTER (June 28, 2017, 2:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/kmedved/status/876869328934711296?s=20 [https://perma.cc/3BPHAHSH] (“Antitrust hipsterism. Everything old is cool again.”).
9
Id.
10
See Ico Maly & Piia Varis, The 21st-Century Hipster: On Micro-Populations in
Times of Superdiversity, EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD., Aug. 2015, at 1, 3, 10 (“[T]he notion
‘hipster’ itself is rarely clearly defined—it seems to be used as if its meaning was
universally fixed and transparent, while in reality its meaning is opaque and fluid.”).
11
Id.
12
See Robert Horning, The Death of the Hipster, in N+1 FOUNDATION ET AL., WHAT
WAS THE HIPSTER?: A SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION 80–81 (2010) (“If you are
concerned enough about the phenomenon to analyse it and discuss it, you are already
somewhere on the continuum of hipsterism and are in the process of trying to rid yourself
of its ‘taint.’”).
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the not-necessarily-still-so-young millennial generation. 13 Nevertheless, these people—hipsters—read as young and underemployed, and they probably have an unprecedented and financially
irresponsible enthusiasm for avocados.
It is disorienting to have a term that can intelligibly capture an
observed phenomenon—we will both somehow understand at least
some of what you mean when you tell me you know a good
“hipster coffee shop”14—while still so ably evading coherent definition. So, what can we make of the meaning of “hipster” in
“hipster antitrust”? Ultimately, the word really tells us next to
nothing about the substance of the movement. Nevertheless, the
word still manages to convey substantial information about the
politics implicated in the “hipster antitrust” paradigm—the sharp
impression is that those who employ the phrase believe that trendsetting, young johnny-come-latelies are peddling an edgy approach
to antitrust that is also tired. Without a doubt, this phrase is an
insult.15 Indeed, George Mason University’s Joshua Wright, who
has been the most enthusiastic popularizer of “hipster antitrust,”
acknowledges this phrase’s effectiveness as an insult, even as he
insists that it remains the most appropriate name for the movement:
[In response to the name] some were even offended,
insisting that the movement be called the New
Brandeis School or New Progressive Antitrust
Movement. With all due respect to those associated
with this movement . . . we adopt the term Hipster
Antitrust here rather than the less well-known
alternatives.16
This is schoolyard-level insult reasoning—“look, snotnose, if you
didn’t want to be called snotnose, why are so many people calling
you snotnose?” Yet, whatever the logic behind it, the attraction for
the name is holding. In fact, it is entirely possible that without
13

Maly & Varis, supra note 10, at 3 (“Hipsters are a subculture of men and women
typically in their 20’s and 30’s that value independent thinking, counter-culture,
progressive politics, an appreciation of art and indie-rock, creativity, intelligence, and
witty banter.”).
14
Id. at 13.
15
Wright et al., supra note 7, at 295.
16
Id.
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“hipster antitrust” (the naming phenomenon), “hipster antitrust”
(the movement it describes) would have less momentum, appeal,
and public recognition. Again, the paradox of hipsterism: the categorization is an insult, and it is loathed, and yet you still recommended that coffee shop, and it is still always packed.
I. WHITHER THE TECHNO-GIANTS?
Tim Wu’s The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded
Age, the latest in Wu’s series of history-minded books accessibly
expounding on the dynamics of competition, does not once use the
word “hipster.”17 All the same, its aim is to both defend and define
the movement Wu would have called Neo-Brandeisianism; what
its critics and the popular press call “hipster antitrust” 18 ; and
what might more descriptively just be called progressive antitrust
reform. This movement, now largely headquartered in the Open
Markets Institute and catalyzed by Lina Khan’s skewering of
Amazon’s corporate dominance in the Yale Law Journal, 19 is
essentially built around the idea that antitrust law took a wrong
turn when it focused the law’s inquiry into anticompetitive behavior on whether a given action benefits or hurts consumer welfare—
that is, whether the behavior typically raises or lowers consumer
prices.20 For instance, under the current state of the law, antitrust
harms are theorized out of existence when a firm engages in “predatory pricing” (setting the price below cost in order to drive competitors out of the market) 21 because, in Wu’s words, “that which
did not exist in theory probably did not exist in practice,”22 and in
the meantime consumers benefit from lowered prices. 23 Instead,
per Khan, the reformists argue that “gauging real competition in
17

See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE
(2018).
18
See id.; see also supra Introduction.
19
See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2017).
20
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
107–15 (1978).
21
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/predatory-orbelow-cost [https://perma.cc/4ACB-LD6Q].
22
WU, supra note 17, at 107.
23
See id.
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the twenty-first century marketplace—especially in the case of
online platforms—requires analyzing the underlying structure and
dynamics of markets.”24 To compensate, antitrust analysis should
“examine the competitive process itself,” rather than “pegging
competition to a narrow set of outcomes.”25
The Curse of Bigness, like Wu’s earlier books The Master
Switch 26 and The Attention Merchants, 27 proceeds with detailed
portraits of key players—microbiographies personalizing the
dynamics he is trying to capture. The epistemology here appears to
be a variant on the aphorism about needing to look back to move
forward: there are direct lessons for the present in the relatively
recent past, regardless of how new and shiny our current circumstances feel. Nevertheless, while this newest installment does complement Wu’s earlier works, even where it retreads some of the
same ground, The Curse of Bigness is doing something quite
different. Situated first and foremost in the current political and
intellectual moment, this book’s defense of what Wu refuses to call
hipster antitrust feels urgent.
The history-first approach belies the thematic urgency, but Wu
compensates for it with uncharacteristic brevity. The cast for Curse
of Bigness is a focused one: Brandeis, the principled progressive;28
Roosevelt, the mercurial trustbuster; John D. Rockefeller and John
Pierpont Morgan, the vintage fatcats;29 Aaron Director and Robert
Bork, monopoly’s apologists.30 These actors assemble neatly into
the dialectic Wu is exploring as a partisan: those who expressly
view antitrust as an inherently political arena, a necessary check on
concentrations of power toxic to democracy; and those who view
antitrust as a narrow tool best confined to very rarely remedying a
very particular kind of economic wrong. Brandeis theorizes on the
side of a political antitrust, and Roosevelt acts; Rockefeller and
24

Khan, supra note 19, at 717.
Id.
26
See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
17–32 (2010).
27
See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR
HEADS 11–23 (2017).
28
See WU, supra note 17, at 34–44.
29
See id. at 45–77.
30
See id. at 78–92.
25
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Morgan monopolize their way into a gilded age; Bork and Director
build the theoretical groundwork for their return.
The mini-biographical model works well here in part because
the larger story Wu tells is about the life cycle of ideas: the
circumstances that cause them to take root, the people who champion them, how they compete, win, and lose. Antitrust law’s original and central text, the Sherman Act,31 “is so broadly worded and
unclear in its application that it does not take real meaning or shape
without an enforcement tradition,”32 leaving its meaning and practice largely contingent on the rise and fall of the ideas of the day.
And this is really a story about how the Chicago school, primarily
through the scholarship of Robert Bork,33 won the day and left us
with an antitrust law affirmatively comfortable with monopoly
power and willing to support its exercise in all but a very
few ways.
One way of understanding Bigness is as Wu picking up from
where The Master Switch punted. In concluding that book, Wu
wrote:
To leave the economy of information, and power
over this commodity, subject solely to the traditional ad hoc ways of dealing with concentrations
of industrial power—in other words, to antitrust
law—is dangerous. Without venturing into the long,
rancorous debate over what, if any, kind of antitrust
policy is proper in our system, I would argue that by
their nature, those particular laws alone are inadequate for the regulation of information industries.34
The time has come, apparently, to weigh into the rancorous debate,
and to come down firmly on the need for “big case” interventions.
Why now?
There need not be just one answer. When the hipsters come to
gentrify your neighborhood, there are generally a number of factors at play—generational, cultural, financial. Similarly, no single
31
32
33
34

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2018).
WU, supra note 17, at 50–51.
See generally BORK, supra note 21, at 405–07.
WU, supra note 26, at 303–04.
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reason explains why the current moment feels ripe for a turn to a
more robust and populist understanding of antitrust. Dramatically,
the darkness of the political scene sparks reminders of how industrial consolidation abetted the rise of fascism in Europe.35 The success of the Chicago school in the academy and on the bench, the
paucity of muscular antitrust action from government, the increase
in consolidation generally—all are motivating, and all are central
themes of Wu’s book. However, the single greatest propellant has
to be the highly visible, grokkable, everyday dominance of Big
Tech: Google, for (at least) search; Amazon, for (at least) ecommerce; Facebook, for social media. These enterprises and their
clout are so great that there is even a word for the phenomenon of
growing popular discontent for the giants: “techlash.” 36
For a book with a palpable and timely political agenda, and one
so deeply tied to popular concern over the “tech trusts,” written by
the coiner of net neutrality and a theorist of the web, Wu manages
to spend surprisingly little ink addressing tech’s role in the current
moment—just a scant seven pages capping his broader tracing of
antitrust history and concluding, unceremoniously, that “[i]f there
is a sector more ripe for the reinvigoration of the big case tradition,
I do not know it.” 37
If the existence of the popular techlash proves anything, it is
that one does not need to expressly identify as a New Brandeisian
to worry about the clout of today’s technology monopolists. The
last handful of years has featured a steady drumbeat of books decrying the power, influence, and malfeasance (both documented
and suspected) of big tech.38 Most of these do not focus on bigness
35
At least, this is the history as Wu relates it. See WU, supra note 17, at 79–80. The
adoption of a causal claim attributing Hitler’s rise to power, at least in part, to German
industrial concentration has not gone undisputed. See, e.g., Alec Stapp, Tim Wu’s Bad
History: Big Business and the Rise of Fascism, NISKANEN CTR. (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/big-business-rise-fascism-bad-history-tim-wu
[https://perma.cc/X7ZV-6C62]. For my part, I think it is fair to think that mere
correlation is sufficient cause for wariness when it comes to the incubation of fascism.
36
See Word of the Year 2018: Shortlist, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxford
dictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/shortlist-2018 [https://perma.cc/KR5M-6VAH].
37
WU, supra note 17, at 126.
38
WU, supra note 17, at 126; see also THREAT OF BIG TECH 11–12 (2017); see also
generally JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE,
AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY (2017); ANDREW
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first, but rather tend to target particular manifestations of corporate
power. Indeed, bigness amplifies the potentially harmful impacts
of activity that might otherwise appear somewhat remote from
antitrust law.
In copyright, for instance, it is not an exaggeration to say that
the bigness of big technology is presently the driver of most of
our major public policy debates. That is, the leading proposals
presently on the table for reforming our copyright law—proposals
that are proving to have legs, particularly in Europe where a new,
tech-oriented copyright directive just recently passed 39 —emerge
primarily from concerns about how both individual copyright
owners and the culture industry are manhandled by the biggest
technology players.40 These proposals represent a significant shift
in regulatory approach. The early internet threat 41 to copyright
was, like the model of the early internet, largely a distributed one;
the potential difficulty for copyright owners was straightforward
and now very familiar—with everyone possessing networked
copying devices (our computers and phones and other gizmos),
everyone becomes a potential pirate of copyrighted work, limited
only by individuals’ respect for, or fear of, the legal prohibition on
sharing copyright-protected content.
That dynamic of decentralization led to a decade characterized
by industry lawsuits targeting individual infringers and countless
millions of letters telling individuals to knock it off, and millions

KEEN, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER (2015); ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE’S
PLATFORM: AND OTHER DIGITAL DELUSIONS (2014); JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE
FUTURE? (2013).
39
See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, at 29, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept.
14, 2016) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
40
See Richard Smirke, European Union Passes Sweeping Copyright Reforms, Ending
Safe Harbor for YouTube, BILLBOARD (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/
articles/business/8504177/european-union-article-13-copyright-reforms-safe-harboryoutube-passage (framing the most controversial European reform as targeting YouTube
specifically) (subscription paywall).
41
I borrow the term from James Boyle though I use it here more loosely. See JAMES
BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 54–82 (2008).
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more directing intermediaries to remove suspect content.42 In the
decentralized net, the leading copyright battles concerned how to
best make an unruly public a rule-abiding one; or, from another
perspective, how to maintain an effective copyright regime without
threatening the generative potential of the network. 43 Copyright
industry groups have since mostly moved on 44 : business model
realignments have been directed toward finding new equilibriums
focused on lower-cost, library-scale, internet-mediated access to
content, while industry has sharpened the focus of its ire toward
the tech giants who hastened the change and appear to be wringing
more benefit from this arrangement than the content industry
browbeaten into it.
To no small degree, this shift from a decentralized threat to a
centralized one is an antitrust story—or a lack of antitrust story. In
the heady early internet days, firms came and went, and the idea of
lasting online dominance appeared illusory. But, by the mid aughts
the ground had shifted. Per Wu, “[s]uddenly, there weren’t a dozen
search engines, each with a different idea, but one search engine.
There were no longer hundreds of stores that everyone went to, but
one ‘everything store.’ And to avoid Facebook was to make yourself a digital hermit.”45 While some of this growth might be best
understood as the result of “superior skill, foresight, and industry” 46 —the cunning and dynamism that has long convinced the
courts to tolerate the resulting monopolies47—much of it was also
simply the result of mergers and acquisitions that would have
raised alarm bells in an earlier age. Facebook acquired WhatsApp
42

See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) (in part reflecting on the legacy of these enforcement
campaigns).
43
Of course, opinions vary wildly as to what makes for an effective copyright regime.
44
The “mostly” caveat here is important. Some segments of the copyright economy
still target individual infringers as a matter of course, but this approach appears to survive
more as a lucrative sideline for the pornography industry than as a concerted effort to
shape behavior. See, e.g., Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This
Erotica Web Site, NEW YORKER (May 14, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/business/
currency/the-biggest-filer-of-copyright-lawsuits-this-erotica-web-site [https://perma.cc/
9VR8-QEM3].
45
WU, supra note 17, at 121.
46
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
47
See, e.g., id.
THE
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and Instagram, the two leading upstart competitors in core areas of
Facebook business.48 Google, struggling to capture market share
with its Google Video service, simply acquired YouTube.49
Let us consider YouTube. One way of understanding YouTube
is as a host of user-submitted video. Users, of course, are the very
same people previously at the pointy end of copyright infringement
lawsuits, and their habits and knowledge of the liability landscape
are not much changed. That is, users reliably post infringing material on any platform to which they have access, perhaps with an
accompanying “no infringement intended” caption. Making the
business work despite rampant user misbehavior is the fact that
YouTube benefits from the availability of a “safe harbor” under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act—essentially, YouTube and its
parent company are shielded from liability for the copyright
infringements of its users as part of the grand bargain Congress
reached to ensure that service providers are able to exist at all to
host user content.50 The tradeoff is that, to ensure safe harbor eligibility, YouTube has to remove user-posted videos promptly after
receiving notice from rightsholders.51 YouTube has been receiving
and acting on 52 these notices at considerable scale for much of
its existence.
If this were all YouTube was, it would—at this point anyway 53 —be largely noncontroversial for copyright stakeholders.
The notice-and-takedown balance does not exactly leave everyone

48

See Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg Plans to Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook
Messenger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/
technology/facebook-instagram-whatsapp-messenger.html
[https://perma.cc/B2Y54EMS].
49
See Victor Luckerson, A Decade Ago, Google Bought YouTube—and It Was the Best
Tech Deal Ever, RINGER (Oct. 10, 2016, 8:30 AM EDT), https://www.theringer.com/
2016/10/10/16042354/google-youtube-acquisition-10-years-tech-deals-69fdbe1c8a06
[https://perma.cc/S4XW-HP6K].
50
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018).
51
See id. § 512(c).
52
See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(describing YouTube’s compliance with large number of notices for clips in suit).
53
It should go without saying that direct pushback against user-uploaded video hosts
has very much been a thing, featuring flagship suits against YouTube and its competitors.
See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022, 1022–23 (9th
Cir. 2011); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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happy (rightsholders do not consider the resulting whack-a-mole
game to be a solution; user advocates balk at abuse of the
takedown process), but it does not seem to break anything either.
But YouTube is not merely a host of user-submitted video. For
one thing, it is effectively the host for user-generated video—its
particular combination of price point (i.e., free), visibility, and
comprehensiveness has no peer. YouTube hoovers up hundreds of
hours of video every minute, serves a monthly audience of roughly
two billion logged-in users, and streams more than a billion hours
of video per day.54 Alexa, the web metrics company and Amazon
subsidiary, ranks YouTube as the world’s second most popular
website. 55 YouTube provides its simple-sounding service—video
hosting—in a way that nobody else does and, given the operation’s
scale, expense, lead-time, and comprehensiveness, nobody else
likely can.
Moreover, YouTube is a great deal more than just a host of
“user-generated” video: it is also a leading provider of professionally and semi-professionally made video, the world’s most popular
music streaming service,56 and a cable company of sorts, providing
access to a bundle of live television.57 It is impossible to forget that
YouTube is also an Alphabet (that is, Google) subsidiary—a key
part of the larger Google ecosystem and a close relative of that
conglomerate’s other media efforts like its video store (Google
Play Movies), music store (Google Play Music), and separate subscription music streaming service (Google Music).58
That YouTube is all of these things—enormous, vertically and
horizontally integrated, dominant—is, of course, bound to have
54

Press, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/press [https://perma.cc/4UE3SR8S].
55
The Top 500 Sites on the Web, ALEXA, https://www.alexa.com/topsites [https://
perma.cc/L92Z-F9BV].
56
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., MUSIC CONSUMER INSIGHT REPORT 13
(2018),
https://www.ifpi.org/downloads/music-consumer-insight-report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN8N-3SHB].
57
YouTube TV, YOUTUBE, https://tv.youtube.com [https://perma.cc/QE3A-2DC9].
58
See Alejandro Alba, A List—from A to Z—of All the Companies, Brands Google's
Alphabet Currently Owns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nydaily
news.com/news/world/z-list-brands-companies-google-alphabet-owns-article-1.2321981
[https://perma.cc/5P8K-LLLW].
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visible effects in its relationship with the media industry that
owns the rights to many high-value infringed materials. This is not
simply a people-will-post-what-they-will situation where YouTube
and rightsholder groups follow the statutorily provided path forward. Instead, YouTube, at considerable expense, has developed
Content ID—a system it uses to, well, identify content uploaded to
its service. 59 So, for example, if YouTube has a fingerprint of
a given song or video, it can do a decent job of spotting uploads
that incorporate the fingerprinted media.60 With that information,
YouTube can prevent uploads from ever appearing, mute apparently infringing audio, or monetize resulting advertising revenue to
the rightsholder’s benefits.61
Content ID is no silver bullet for the infringement problem.
Representations about copyright ownership are inherently difficult
to verify, 62 meaning any effective implementation will probably
limit access to sophisticated, larger, and more credible rightsholders. Indeed, YouTube’s implementation does exactly that. 63
Yet, so long as the system is underinclusive of rightsholders,
infringing content will continue to be uploaded and shared the way
59

How Content ID Works—YouTube Help, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/
youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en [https://perma.cc/S4GT-3PXA] [hereinafter YouTube
Content ID].
60
This determination is necessarily subjective. Speaking for itself, YouTube calls
Content ID “industry leading.” Manage Your Copyright on YouTube, YOUTUBE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20191118170127/https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/l
esson/copyright-management?cid=copyright&hl=en (archived link dated Nov. 18, 2019).
61
See YouTube Content ID, supra note 59.
62
This is a systemic characteristic flaw of the copyright system in general. Longlasting rights attach to protectable subject matter automatically by operation of law, and
protectable subject matter is an expansive domain. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302 (2018).
While the Copyright Office maintains a registration system and a recordation system for
transfers, both are voluntary. See id. § 408(a). But see id. § 411(a) (stating that
registration, or attempted registration, is necessary to commence a civil infringement
action). Among the results of this state of affairs is that most everyone controls myriad
copyright interests, but the credibility of any individual claim is often dubious. The most
well-known upshot of this state of affairs is the phenomenon of “orphan works”—that is,
protected works without an identifiable owner due to the lack of apparent rightsholder
information or a murky chain of title. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN
WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQ8J-8KTD].
63
See YouTube Content ID, supra note 60.
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it always has. Just as importantly, the metes and bounds of copyright’s exclusive rights are poorly suited to algorithmic interpretation. 64 Infringing works can be so dissimilar from the originals
as to escape detection, and noninfringing works can borrow
enough from others as to throw flags, or otherwise their status as
noninfringing can be dependent on context not available to the
machine. 65 YouTube works to correct the system’s tendency toward underenforcement by providing less-powerful tools to those
outside the Content ID system, 66 and to correct the tendency
toward overenforcement by providing in-house dispute procedures
for resolving complaints over wrongful Content ID-facilitated
actions. Even though the system Google has developed would
appear to realign the baseline in rightsholders’ favor, it is not a system that, on balance, is going to make anyone very happy.
As a result, Content ID is a powerful bargaining chip for
YouTube in its dealings with rightsholders. YouTube is now infamous among musicians and the larger recording industry for its
low royalty rates relative even to its notoriously tightfisted competition67—and its edge makes good sense. YouTube, with its scale,
can comfortably know that most anything that has been taken
down will come back up. YouTube has, and will continue to have,
an unparalleled library to draw from thanks to user uploads.
Rightsholders, given the choice either to struggle against the tide
using the statutory tools provided by the DMCA or to sign up for
Content ID, have a clear incentive to use Content ID: use of the
system offers worlds-more expedient and reliable identification of
64

For instance, copyright doctrine recognizes both “literal” and “non-literal”
infringements. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960). Literal copying is, typically, easy to recognize: protected expression is taken
directly. Id. Non-literal infringement, where the copying at issue is in some way
abstracted, is much trickier. Id. Complicating matters further, copyright limitations—
most notably fair use—have boundaries that are necessarily determined ad hoc. See, e.g.,
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2015).
65
See Copyright Management Tools—YouTube Help, YOUTUBE, https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/9245819 [https://perma.cc/F6CU-LEJW].
66
See id.
67
See Daniel Sanchez, What Streaming Music Services Pay (Updated for 2018),
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/01/
16/streaming-music-services-pay-2018 [https://perma.cc/QTH9-4VM4] (“Last year, at
$0.00006 per play, [YouTube] had the worst artist revenue payouts.”).
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infringing content, and more fine-grained control over how to
respond to individual cases. The catch, of course, is that YouTube
can leverage access to the tool—or possible uses of the tool—in its
negotiations with rightsholders for licensed access to their content.
The resulting arrangements are tightly controlled by nondisclosure agreements, but it is clear that access to the full suite of
Content ID’s features is both a carrot and a stick. When YouTube
wants to expand into new areas, as when it set about building its
music subscription service, for instance, the exchange appears to
have been participation in the program—with complete catalogs—
or else the loss of monetization.68 Make some money YouTube’s
way and at YouTube’s rates, or else make no money on YouTube
at all. Either way, rightsholders’ content will still be there, or be
coming back there soon. The same copyright carveout that makes
YouTube possible as a host for user-generated content also arms
the platform powerfully in its quest to serve a half dozen other
roles as a provider of copyrighted work entirely distinct from that
of a neutral intermediary.
We can see this as a bigness problem or as a copyright problem—or perhaps, as no problem at all. If YouTube stood alone, or
if it operated solely as a user-generated enterprise without ambitions across parallel industries, or it were just smaller, the balance
struck by the DMCA safe harbor would probably continue to work
acceptably well, just as it does for most websites hosting usergenerated content. With bigness more or less off the table as a realistic target—and with many copyright industry players themselves
potentially subject to attacks on bigness—it makes sense that
YouTube’s critics in the traditional content industries have framed
the issue as one of copyright law rather than one of antitrust.
So now the European Union has adopted a new approach to the
copyright responsibilities of online hosts of user content,69 one that
appears targeted at YouTube first and foremost.70 In a major reversal, this new directive will obligate hosts—with no meaningful
68
See Zoë Keating, What Should I Do About Youtube?, TUMBLR (2015),
https://zoekeating.tumblr.com/post/108898194009/what-should-i-do-about-youtube
[https://perma.cc/46ZH-XLZ9].
69
See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29.
70
See Smirke, supra note 41.
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carveouts for scale for most of them—to attempt to secure licenses
for any material that might be uploaded and prevent the public
availability of material identified by rightsholders. 71 Put another
way, the directive would make Content ID-like screening of
uploads mandatory, while pressuring service providers to secure
licenses from major rightsholders or rights management groups.
Rightsholders will have automated screening technology work
to augment their own bargaining power rather than that of online
intermediaries.
Nevertheless, the move can look bewildering on its surface:
rightsholders’ concerns about YouTube’s clout are almost singlehandedly driving an effort to write into law a technical hurdle
that would appear to make YouTube almost singularly competition
proof. Yes, rightsholders would have more leverage over
YouTube, but by imposing technical requirements that play directly to YouTube’s strongest competitive advantage, they would
help ensure that meaningful competition will be absent from this
space for generations.
The YouTube story evinces an arms-race solution to monopoly: in the face of overwhelming licensee market power, the
copyright industry is turning to legislative means of acquiring
more of their own. You may not be able to kill your giant, but you
may yet be able to highjack, emulate, or piggyback on its dominance. This is a remarkably brazen approach to antitrust harms:
your monopoly power is too strong; the remedy is to increase my
own or to share in some of yours. In the copyright-industry wars
against the technology giants, this approach is now a common one:
Amazon is a bully to publishers; publishers allied with Apple to fix
prices, wanting to equal its bully’s power while maintaining access
to its essential customer base.72 Google bullied its way into build-

71

See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29 (known popularly as Article 13
under the draft numbering).
72
This particular cartel, crossing antitrust’s still-firm bar against price fixing, did draw
the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) attention, resulting in settlements from the publisher
defendants and a loss in court for Apple. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290,
296–97 (2d Cir. 2014). I have written about this case elsewhere. See generally Michael
Wolfe, The Apple E-Book Agreement and Ruinous Competition: Are E-Goods Different
for Antitrust Purposes?, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 129 (2014). Amazon, despite drawing
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ing the world’s largest library of digital books73; publishers and
authors used a copyright lawsuit to try and cement Google’s position as the sole provider of out-of-commerce texts while taking a
cut of the proceeds.74 Google is comfortably profitable and links
individuals to news reporting while the news business flounders
globally75; therefore, the news business advocates for—and secures
in Europe—a new copyright-like press-publishers right that would
entitle them to payment for these links.76 It is now awkwardly apparent that many of the copyright industries’ giant-killers do not
appear to be exactly sincere in their ambitions, looking at every
turn more eager to make or to force a power-sharing deal than to
strike a blow capable of making genuine change.
Of course, the industrial titans of our new gilded age have
made enemies in almost every sector of the economy, even if
antitrust allegations over its practices in the book industry, has not faced a real antitrust
challenge. See Khan, supra note 19, at 710.
73
Google characterizes its Google Books project as the “world’s most comprehensive,” and there is no reason to disbelieve the claim. See Google Books, GOOGLE,
https://books.google.com [https://perma.cc/6UNG-LM7M]. The collection was built, in
large part, by the wholescale scanning of research library collections under a latervindicated theory that copyright law would not prevent the use. See Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2014). Today, the collection has more than 40
million volumes. 15 Years of Google Books, GOOGLE (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
blog.google/products/search/15-years-google-books [https://perma.cc/957S-VETX].
74
The proposal took the form of a sweeping class action settlement that would have
remade the market for older books. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book
Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2011). The settlement was
ultimately scuttled by the district court following sharp criticism by the public and the
submission of Justice Department arguments about potential antitrust concerns. See
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The copyright suit
and its twin—a case against Google’s library partners—ultimately resulted in a pair of
remarkable fair use rulings that upheld the digitization effort as lawful. See generally
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013).
75
See Google News, GOOGLE, https://news.google.com [https://perma.cc/P4WLN4RF]. While the relationship between online news aggregation and the decline of news
reporting is a difficult one to untangle, traditional news reporting has contracted
significantly in the internet era. See U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Dropped a Quarter
Since 2008, with Greatest Decline at Newspapers, PEW RES. CTR. (July 9, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-hasdropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008 [https://perma.cc/8RLC-QV7A].
76
The new European-wide press-publishers right is also found in the 2019 copyright
directive. See Commission Proposal, supra note 40, at 29 (widely known as Article 11
following the draft numbering).
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the copyright industries stand out as being particularly aggrieved.
In 2019, we all might have good reason to question the wisdom
of YouTube’s bigness, or that of any of the technology giants.
YouTube’s control over how videos are recommended or
autoplayed shapes what we see and hear, and those choices—like,
say, Facebook’s choices in what the newsfeed displays—have
drifted toward providing toxic misinformation and conspiracy. 77
These are the Cheetos of information goods: glaringly and facially
bad for you, yet still craved and loved by millions. No terribly
compelling counteraction has been found to the incentives steering
online intermediaries toward the serving of bad information, and—
particularly in the absence of workable answers—the idea that
whatever solutions we have, whatever online media environment
we receive, will most likely be the result of the secretive internal
deliberations of a small handful of profit-seeking firms is one that
should be frightening to any small-d democrat.
But if bigness is readily apparent as a source of identifiable
complaints, a tension remains between antitrust solutions to social
problems and alternative piecemeal regulatory solutions. It is not at
all clear that any of these problems should be solved by antitrust,
and certainly most can be tackled through other means, just as
YouTube’s clout with the copyright industries is addressable
through changes to copyright law. Indeed, the key challenge issued
by the consumer welfare standard’s defenders is that antitrust
reformers naively view the antitrust laws (and/or antitrust remedies) as a cure-all for a diverse set of much more specific problems
that may or may not be best remedied by countering bigness per
se—in the words of Wright et al., the hipsters advocate “antitrust
regulation expansive enough to solve societal woes ranging from
economic inequality to climate change.”78

77

See generally Kevin Roose, YouTube Unleashed a Conspiracy Theory Boom. Can It
Be Contained?, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/
technology/youtube-conspiracy-stars.html [https://perma.cc/7PBQ-98ME]; Alexis C.
Madrigal, What Facebook Did to American Democracy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502
[https://perma.cc/SC3C-CXNC].
78
Wright et al., supra note 7.
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The truth is that law shapes markets from both the top-down
(how we regulate market structure, with antitrust) and from the
bottom-up (the ground rules we set for industries and businesses).
It would be naive to think that one approach can solve all woes.
Yet how do we determine ex ante where the more appropriate solution for a given problem lies?
II. GRAPPLING WITH BORK’S LEGACY
Robert Bork published The Antitrust Paradox more than forty
years ago, crystallizing his ideas on antitrust into rules that have
largely steered the law since. By now even Bork’s most sympathetic readers, those keen to reign in the wilder antitrust enforcement of the 1960s and give limiting principles and rigor to the
field, would admit that the book’s approach is looking dated. Bork
himself—taking aim at the earlier antitrust approaches and policies
Wu would in part revive—aptly summed up the risk of reliance on
mistakes, writing: “Wrong ideas, repeated often enough, lodge
themselves in the culture as well as the law, and then proceed to
expand according to their inner logic.”79 The stakes for the rightness or wrongness of Bork’s conception of antitrust are that, at this
point in American antitrust’s history, no ideas have been repeated
as often, or as influentially, as Bork’s.
The most wrong idea Bork spawned here, for progressive antitrust reformers, is the foundational one: “The only legitimate goal
of American antitrust law,” argues The Antitrust Paradox, “is the
maximization of consumer welfare.” 80 This standard contains a
specific prescription for how antitrust law should consider cases
(in practice, looking at the price effects of the activity in question),
a limiting principle making this prescription exclusive, and is built
on the theory that a famously vague law that had been otherwise
interpreted for nearly three quarters of a century has nevertheless
always required both adoption of this particular standard and the
exclusion of others.

79
80

BORK, supra note 20, at 420.
Id. at 51.
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It is possible to find wrongness here at several levels. Most
fundamentally, one can question the value of consumer welfare as
a yardstick, but there is a baby in that bathwater. 81 Instead, the
more profitable tack is to target the test’s exclusivity and its necessity—to demand an antitrust law that may see the consumer welfare standard supplemented, or perhaps in certain cases even
supplanted, with other considerations as circumstances demand.
Scholars and practitioners working within the post-Bork mainstream may find this pushback puzzling, not because it is the law
or its standards are beyond reproach, but rather because there may
be room for reform within the confines of the prevailing tradition.
Yes, Bork’s worldview is so narrow as to dismiss outside harms—
even if precipitated by activities squarely in antitrust’s wheelhouse—as “not antitrust issues,” and to conclude that these harms
“must be taken care of by other laws.”82 Nevertheless, assuming
either that Bork was right, or else that we have to pretend he was,
does it really lead to the conclusions and limitations the NeoBrandeisians are chafing under? After all, we have an antitrust
literature that purports to apply the standard with more depth than
Bork was willing to allow that might provide for a more robust law
within the confines of the existing approach. For antitrust, the
promise of behavioral law and economics, of information economics, and of innovation economics is that given sufficient depth, we
might more clearly and accurately recognize where market structure creates welfare problems that under more superficial analyses
might otherwise fail to render fully.83
Viewed charitably, Bork’s antitrust legacy can be read as
a laudable kind of intellectual modesty. Legal interventions that
offer treble damages, the power to break up big companies, or the
imposition of perpetual government oversight over the market
decisions of private actors may be necessary, but these are all
notably powerful responses. Allowing for action of this sort without fully understanding the stakes and the likely effects is danger81
See WU, supra note 17, at 135 (“While the tools of economics will always be
essential to antitrust work, it is a disservice to the laws and their intent to retain such a
laserlike focus on price effects as the measure of all that antitrust was meant to do.”).
82
BORK, supra note 20, at 248.
83
See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
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ous, the thinking goes, so putting action before theory is a cartbefore-horse kind of move. Welfarism is mercifully capacious: all
the misleading references to “consumers” aside, what both Bork
and modern antitrust care about is maximizing social welfare. 84
Utilitarians, at least, can feel comfortable with the target even if
there is plenty of room to quibble with the methodology, and glad
to see the law evolve with our understanding of how market structure and competitive processes affect welfare. There would be
something appealing about this kind of intellectual modesty, if it
were not paired with the jarring audaciousness of Borkean exclusivity: by restricting all possible theories of harm to those understood by a welfare analysis, the argument pairs its humble mantle
of restraint with an imperial crown. Remember, princes: to pass as
paupers, you are going to have to commit to completing the look.
There ought to be a word—and perhaps there is, I don’t claim
perfect knowledge here—for the use of an over-powered specialist
tool to identify with care and precision the big, obvious thing that
is right there in front of you.85 The Curse of Bigness wants first and
foremost to make antitrust capable of dealing with the harms consolidation and monopoly can have for democracy, noting that “the
struggle for democracy now and in the progressive era must be one
centered on private power—in both its influence over, and union
with, government.”86 For reformists, this is the big, obvious thing
right in front of us all, and they have had enough of antitrust law
puzzling over it with a microscope. Allowing that maybe we can
craft a price-theory-driven antitrust law with a complexified
awareness and treatment of irrational actors, imperfect knowledge,
innovation, and market dynamism that is sufficiently well-tuned to
see and speak to these other harms, how long can we wait for price
effects to convincingly speak to principles of governance if in the
meantime democracy is crumbling?

84

See generally Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133 (2011) (exploring the confusion surrounding Bork’s
“consumer welfare” nomenclature).
85
If we adopt “economize” for the purpose, it would have the benefit of being a near
autoantoynm, but I am sure there are many equally good candidates.
86
WU, supra note 17, at 139.
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It bears noting, however, that in The Antitrust Paradox “predation by abuse of governmental procedures” is expressly an antitrust
harm, and one to which Bork is actually sympathetic.87 This makes
sense: Bork’s ideology and economics (assuming the two are separable) both caution against the evils of too-big government, so flipping the script on antitrust to make it about the potential abuse of
government power rather than the abuse of private power is a natural leap. The obvious solution from a Borkean perspective is a
weaker government, and therefore, less opportunity for abuse. But
recognizing the problem—that businesses can leverage their scale
and power to use government as an anticompetitive weapon—also
opens the door to the idea that private power at governmentshaping scale is insidious to the project of democratic governance.
Again, even though understanding these potential harms in efficiency or price terms is not necessarily impossible, why should we
wait years for economists to squabble over inconclusive and contestable answers if there is a way to express them clearly in strictly
political terms today?
This kind of thinking will lead many antitrust scholars to view
Wu’s book with—at best—irritation. The whole turn of modern
antitrust after Bork and Director was to replace the massively
inconsistent, economically dubious hodgepodge of case law with
some judicially administrable standards and rules applied toward
consistent and coherent economic ends.88 Yes, in the process, some
of the political goals of the actual statutes themselves were to be
given up—an ironic revolution to be started by Bork, a scholar
who declared his undying fidelity to (constitutional) framers, but
87

BORK, supra note 20, at 364.
Wu does not pretend that pre-Chicago antitrust law was somehow free of these
problems: his defense of earlier practice concedes the point some have viewed as going
too far.
It would be crazy, however, to defend every case that was brought as
part of the big case tradition. For example, in the 1970s, the Federal
Trade Commission went after the cereal industry based on the
observation that it was profitable and somewhat concentrated. . . .
The agency believed that product differentiation (that is, products
aimed at children, older people, the health-conscious, and so on) was
the anti-competitive tool of choice. To even describe the theory is to
reveal its absurdity.
WU, supra note 17, at 113–14.
88
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made perhaps his biggest mark on the academy by encouraging
scholars and the courts to ignore the intentions of (legislative)
framers.89 Nevertheless, leaving aside the irony, antitrust scholars
were right about the chaos and economic incoherence of the doctrine,90 and might rightly worry about the fate of the decades of
work done since to at least try and right it. To have a critic arrive
and urge us to focus once again on political economy, on bigness’
costs to innovation and democracy, may seem like the worst kind
of backpedaling.
Moreover, antitrust scholars—notably including many who
have a less robust faith in the self-policing capacity of markets
than Bork and Director—could argue that antitrust law and scholarship are already doing what Wu calls for, albeit in a more disciplined way. Antitrust law does look at the dangers of government
cooptation and, as the Bork quotation above suggests, has done so
throughout the modern era.91 There have also been thoughtful discussions of the tradeoff between short-run efficiency and long-term
innovation,92 and the need to chasten muscular neo-classical economics with more critical approaches that draw on traditions such
as behavioral economics93 or institutional economics.94
89

See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143–60 (1997). Of
course, the inconsistency is not one Bork himself would have acknowledged. Bork argues
in Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act that his own reading of antitrust
law is, in fact, the only faithful interpretation of the legislation—a position that strains
credulity and Bork’s own source material. See WU, supra note 17, at 87–88, 89 (quoting
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989)).
90
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
91
Consider, for instance, the long—if tellingly inconclusive—back and forth on how
antitrust should incorporate and respond to state capture. See generally John T. Delacourt
& Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of
Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075 (2005); Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism
and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1293 (1988); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,
99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986).
92
See generally, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 247 (2007). This literature is certainly not lost on Wu, given his contributions to it.
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation
Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 313 (2012).
93
Behavioral economics have of course served as a leading counterbalance to the
assumptions made across the spectrum of fields where law and economics have been
influential, and antitrust is no exception. See Avishalom Tor, Understanding Behavioral
Antitrust, 92 TEX. L. REV. 573, 576–77 n.7 (2014) (collecting scholarly literature). But
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To put the two critiques together, antitrust scholars might say,
“you are throwing away all we have achieved in this attempt
to turn back to messy, intuitive political economy, when we are
actually well aware of the dangers you cite, and have accounted for
them in various sophisticated ways.” This is, in one sense, a fair
critique. Wu does not do a deep dive into the economics and
econometrics of modern antitrust law. Nor does he stress the dangers of incoherent, “I know it when I see it” antitrust enforcement.
Point taken. In another sense, this critique misses Wu’s argument
at a fundamental level—that antitrust, including current antitrust, is
always already political in its choices. Economics provides no
escape from those value choices, it merely picks one desirable
value (consumer welfare) from an abundant normative basket.
Moreover, antitrust is not just about theory; it is about
enforcement, the inevitable need to rank and prioritize a hierarchy
of values. The original Brandeisian movement was prompted by a
political urgency, a call to action because both market and polity
were being disfigured by the trusts. 95 The behavioralist, innovation, and institutionalist epicycles that recent scholars have added
to antitrust’s orrery96 do indeed parallel some of Wu’s concerns,
though at a third, fourth or fifth remove from the efficiency calculus.97 Wu, however, like the Brandeisians, is saying that our time

see Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1517 (2012) (finding behavioral
economics traditions “irrelevant” for antitrust analysis and not providing cause for a more
interventionist antitrust policy).
94
Oliver Williamson, coiner of “new institutional economics,” OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: A STUDY IN THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS 1
(1983), was, notably, motivated in his antitrust work by frustration with the lack of
economic rigor seen in his experience as a Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust in the late 1960s. See Carl Shapiro, A Tribute to Oliver
Williamson: Antitrust Economics, 52 CAL. MGMT. REV. 138, 138–39 (2010). While those
contributions and those of following works are consistent with skepticism of pre-Chicago
antitrust methodology, they also provide nuanced results that can be at odds with the
Borkean neo-classical baseline. See Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics,
Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 95, 97 (2002) (“[T]ransaction
cost economics [TCE] . . . may lead to different conclusions from mainstream approaches
that ignore TCE considerations.”).
95
See WU, supra note 17, at 38.
96
See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
97
My thanks to James Boyle for assisting with this metaphor.
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calls for a different vision in which those concerns are at the center, not the periphery. He is also saying that contemporary reality
and contemporary enforcement practice give ample evidence that
those concerns are indeed at the periphery. He may be eliding
some of the subtleties of contemporary antitrust scholarship, or
the virtues of its goals but, if they miss that crucial dimension, the
critics of Wu’s work are missing his point.
CONCLUSION
The history Wu recounts demonstrates that ideas, ably wielded
in the right moment and aptly tailored to their institutional context,
can be powerfully transformative—in the case of antitrust, helping
outline the shape and structure of our economy, with all the knockon effects that come with that kind of high-level tinkering. Today,
there is no doubt that we are currently in a moment where another
inflection in the history of antitrust is possible. The size, visibility,
and rancor of the debate is a testament to the stakes and to the tangibility of the opportunity. The present debate is one of those rare
moments, like those Wu traces, where ideas can be operationalized
and powerful. There is a reason for the name calling: there is something to see here.
Demonstrating the possibility of change and charting the path
ahead, however, are not the same thing. To move their agenda
forward, the ideas challenge-antitrust reformers have are two-fold:
(1) to convincingly undermine antitrust’s reigning idea—the preeminence of the consumer welfare standard—and (2) to outline a
substitute vision of the future. At every turn, the first part of the
challenge has been easier. Critics can easily point out harms that
are clearly about bigness but that the consumer welfare standard
seems to miss. They can offer histories that provide better explanations for the law’s intent. They can take potshots at the economic
theory, and the application of economic theory, that undergirds the
status quo. The work that The Curse of Bigness does is primarily of
this sort.
When it comes to offering an alternative vision, the movement—and Wu—struggles. Not in absolute terms, mind you; they
have plenty of ideas to offer, and Wu’s proposed standard is as
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good as any. Quoting Brandeis, he would have the courts ask
“whether the targeted conduct is that which ‘promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition,’”98 which has the virtues of a good pedigree and a focus on
process over outcome. Recognizing that antitrust is and has always
been political, for reformists, is meant to be liberating. For them,
antitrust can do the abstract work of protecting democratic institutions, countering inequality, and promoting free speech values precisely because these are things that bigness and monopoly threaten,
and antitrust is a body of law that can and has challenged, overseen, and dismantled bigness and monopoly.
For the establishment, however, all of these concepts are dangerously under-specified, and amount to giving the government
carte blanche to go after corporate enemies with only the most
minimal of limiting principles. It might be difficult to imagine a
dangerously unhinged, capricious, and vindictive executive, but try
to picture such a thing, and then hand it a newly empowered and
political antitrust. Specificity and rigor need not entail the consumer welfare standard, but critics have a straightforward case to
make about their importance.
So the most powerful rebuttal to Wu’s view—the one
employed most often and the most credibly by critics of the progressive reformist movement 99 —is simply that there is not anything here to provide a workable and consistent methodology. You
may not like consumer welfare as a yardstick, but it at least looks
like something we can measure against or at least theorize about
using the tools we have at our disposal.100 Wu does not, and probably cannot, counter that notion.
The disagreement between Wu and his critics reflects a conflict
that runs far deeper than just antitrust: the appeal of rules that seem
possible to consistently and clearly apply is a real one in any
98

WU, supra note 17, at 136.
See, e.g., Wright et al., supra note 7, at 313.
100
Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 526, 527 (1979)
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978)) (“Too often, other [non-efficiency] goals [for antitrust law] are vaguely stated
and invoked uncritically, with the result that such goals are not meaningfully promoted
by proposals that purport to have beneficial effects of a non-efficiency kind.”).
99
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debate, even when their evenhandness or clarity or ability to work
justice is more fiction than fact. This is Robert Bork’s superpower
and most lasting legacy in- and outside of antitrust: the ability to
craft rules that, between their clarity and exclusiveness, stifle competing ideas. Methodological pluralism, balancing tests, and concerns about abstract or indirect consequences are much harder to
justify or explain when your competition offers the simplicity of a
single, clear, and exclusive rule, along with a single, clear, and
exclusive understanding of the harm at stake. To make their ideas
win, reformists will need to pull judges away from a clear test built
to look apolitical—though inaction is never apolitical—to an
unclear one that embraces an antitrust that is essentially political.
This will not be an easy road to walk.
The reformist movement has identified its moment and voiced
its complaint. All eyes are on it. Can it deliver? To the extent the
label provides insight here, it is worth noting that another element
of hipsterism’s paradox lies in the term’s applicability to both
passing fads and moments of genuine upheaval in the cultural bedrock. The antitrust story as Wu relates it is about powerful ideas,
advanced by passionate advocates, taking root in “the culture as
well as the law.”101 The ingredients are all here, now; one would
need to be historically blinkered to think they cannot make this
moment one of real change.

101

BORK, supra note 20, at 420; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.

